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Justice Scalia’s Innocence Tetralogy
Lee Kovarsky

†

For many, U.S. Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia’s
criminal-justice legacy discloses nothing more than pitched
resistance to the rights of defendants and convicted offenders.
Certain features of his jurisprudence, however, complicate that
1
caricature considerably. For example, he moonlighted as the
Court’s most ardent defender of the Sixth Amendment right to
2
confront accusing witnesses. His pro-defense positions formed
a trial-oriented proceduralism in which he de-prioritized
constitutional regulation of outside-the-courtroom behavior,
3
such as policing or the exercise of prosecutorial discretion.
The trial orientation of Justice Scalia’s proceduralism
entailed commitments to certain institutions and skepticism of
others. It formed the basis of his belief that federal courts were
unsuited for evaluating guilt in state criminal cases, and it
reflected his distaste for post-conviction procedure. These two
institutional preferences intersect at a relatively modern
doctrinal phenomenon: the concept of “actual innocence”
litigated in federal habeas corpus proceedings, and usually in
capital cases. In actual innocence litigation, a convicted
offender asserts a mistaken guilt determination as a
constitutional error.
Justice Scalia’s position on actual innocence issues was
inseparable from his hostility to death penalty “abolition,” and
he viewed abolitionists as ringleaders of the wrongful† Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of Law. Copyright ©
2016 by Lee Kovarsky.
1. See generally Stephanos Bibas, Originalism and Formalism in
Criminal Procedure: The Triumph of Justice Scalia, the Unlikely Friend of
Criminal Defendants?, 94 GEO. L.J. 183 (2005) (scrutinizing Justice Scalia’s
surprising pro-defendant streak).
2. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (writing for the
Court).
3. But see Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001) (finding that use of
heat-sensing device was surveillance that, when conducted without a warrant,
violated the Fourth Amendment).
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convictions movement. Sensing the threat that wrongful
executions posed to the sanctity of state criminal process, he
spent his latter years on the Bench arguing that estimates of
such events were inflated. He was unable, however, to
command a majority on his more controversial ideas about
actual innocence in death penalty cases. Instead, his officially
expressed views appear in a “tetralogy” of auxiliary opinions:
4
opinions concurring with judgments in Herrera v. Collins and
5
Kansas v. Marsh, an opinion concurring with the denial of
6
certiorari in Callins v. Collins, and an opinion dissenting from
the order granting a fact-finding transfer to a district court in
7
In re Troy Davis.
Collectively, the Tetralogy captures Justice Scalia at both
his most and his least effective. His sometimes-dazzling
epistemological critique forced a more analytically rigorous
restatement of actual innocence doctrine. His foundational
premise, however, was that the reliability of state guilt
determinations was not systematically overstated. As evidence
inconsistent with that premise mounted, however, he refused to
acknowledge its enormous doctrinal implications. By the time
of his death, his basic epistemological insight had become the
most effective weapon against the deference to state criminal
process that he had originally used it to promote.
I. THE TETRALOGY
In a “freestanding” actual innocence claim, a convicted
offender asserts that she is factually innocent, and asserts
innocence as the exclusive source of a constitutional violation.
For the remainder of this article and unless otherwise
indicated, I use the phrase “innocence claim” to refer to a
freestanding challenge. An innocence claim alleges that an
inmate is actually innocent of whatever crime triggered her
conviction, notwithstanding that she is legally guilty by virtue
of an adverse criminal judgment. The Tetralogy is, I submit, a
meaningful unit of study insofar as it represents the full arc of
Justice Scalia’s actual innocence jurisprudence.
The actual innocence claim lacks clear constitutional
provenance, and it is made in federal post-conviction (habeas)
4.
5.
6.
7.

506 U.S. 390 (1993).
548 U.S. 163 (2006).
510 U.S. 1141 (1994).
557 U.S. 952 (2009).
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proceedings. Concurring in Herrera, Justice Scalia penned
what is considered by many to be the opening modern salvo
8
against actual innocence challenges. His Herrera concurrence
embraced a proceduralist view of guilt that appeared to
strongly disfavor federal consideration of innocence claims. In
subsequent Tetralogy opinions, he restated and refined the
epistemological premises behind his position.
A. HERRERA
In Herrera, the Court inquired as to whether a
freestanding
innocence
claim
alleged
a
cognizable
9
constitutional violation. In one sense, the case was an
imperfect test vehicle for actual innocence theory because the
inmate’s new evidence was not particularly strong. The guilt
determination, however, relied on categories of evidence—
blood-typing, eyewitness identification, and a confession—that
wrongful-conviction studies would later reveal to be deeply
problematic.
Texas had capitally sentenced Herrera for the shooting
deaths of two police officers. One of the slain officers had a
passenger that identified Herrera and, in a dying declaration,
10
the officer did the same. When police arrested Herrera, they
found an inculpatory letter and keys to his girlfriend’s car,
11
which had been used in the murder. The type of blood on
Herrera’s pants and in the car matched with one of the officers,
12
and Herrera’s social security card was found at the scene. The
case, however, still had problems. There had been enormous
pressure to find the officers’ killer, and police almost killed
13
Herrera during interrogation.
He had to be taken—
14
unconscious, bleeding, and paralyzed—to the hospital. The
press covered the murder and interrogation heavily and
15
uniformed police packed the courtroom.
Eyewitness
identifications figured prominently in the prosecution’s case,
8. See Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 428–29 (1993) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
9. See id. at 393.
10. See id. at 394.
11. See id. at 394–95.
12. See id.
13. See Brief for Petitioner at 4, Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993)
(No. 91-7328), 1992 WL 532878 [hereinafter Herrera Petitioner’s Brief].
14. See id. at 9–10.
15. See id. at 13.
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even though they were made under circumstances that modern
forensic analysts would immediately flag as extremely
16
unreliable.
Herrera alleged freestanding innocence in the federal
habeas proceeding, asserting that his recently deceased brother
had actually killed both officers. Herrera introduced evidence
from a former cellmate and a current state judge who both
stated that Herrera’s brother had told them that he had
committed the murders while driving the car that belonged to
17
Herrera’s girlfriend. Herrera supplemented the record with an
affidavit of his nephew, who said that when he was nine years
18
old, he saw his father (Herrera’s brother) kill the officers.
Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote an opinion for the Court
equivocating about whether an inmate alleging only a wrongful
guilt determination was actually claiming an error of
constitutional dimension—although he formally reserved the
possibility that a “truly persuasive showing of innocence” might
19
entitle an inmate to habeas relief. There were four auxiliary
opinions, and Justice Scalia’s rejection of innocence claims
became a centerpiece of the case to foreclose freestanding
innocence litigation entirely. He called attention to “the
reluctance of the present Court to admit publicly that Our
Perfect Constitution lets stand any injustice, much less the
execution of an innocent man who has received, though to no
avail, all the process that our society has traditionally deemed
20
adequate.” Indeed, he expressed skepticism that they would
ever have to answer the actual innocence question, because “it
is improbable that evidence of innocence as convincing as
16. According to Herrera’s briefing, Hernandez could not select Herrera in
the original six-person photo array, but he narrowed it down to three people.
Hernandez was shown a single photo of Hernandez days later—a mug shot—
at which point he told the officers that Herrera was the person who had shot
Officer Carrisalez. Hernandez subsequently picked Herrera out of another
lineup. See id. The Carrisalez ID was a “hospital show-up,” in which
Carrisalez simply nodded at the mugshot. Carrisalez never picked Herrera out
of a lineup. See id. Hospital show-ups are “widely condemned” but in many
cases permitted because there is no other way to get the information from a
dying witness. See Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 302 (1967).
17. The allegation was that Officer Rucker had been involved in
racketeering with multiple members of the Herrera family, including Leonel
(the convicted inmate) and Raoul Sr. (Leonel’s brother). See Herrera
Petitioner’s Brief at 26.
18. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 397.
19. Id. at 417.
20. Id. at 428 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

98

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW HEADNOTES

[101:94

today’s opinion requires would fail to produce an executive
21
pardon.”
B. JUSTICE SCALIA’S POST-HERRERA POSITIONS
At least three distinct propositions are embedded in Justice
Scalia’s position. First, “actual innocence” is a misleading label
insofar as innocence is not presumed; the pertinent question
involves whether the Constitution entitles a legally guilty
inmate to additional process when new evidence makes guilt
less likely. Second, when state process is full and fair,
additional federal process yields little incremental knowledge
about past reality. And third, state process would screen any
innocence claim with evidence sufficient to meet the Court’s
hypothetical threshold.
Justice Scalia would periodically return to Herrera’s
precise doctrinal question (actual innocence claims) and to the
more general point about the institutional competence of
federal courts conducting post-conviction review of state
criminal judgments. In 1994, a year after Herrera, Justice
Blackmun used Callins v. Collins to announce his practice of
conscientious dissent in all capital cases; he declared that,
“from this day forward, I no longer shall tinker with the
22
machinery of death.” Justice Scalia responded acerbically in
this second Tetralogy opinion, chalking changing views of the
death penalty up to the “deeply held” convictions of
abolitionists and remarking that lethal injection seemed a
peaceful death as compared to “the case of the 11-year-old girl
raped by four men and then killed by stuffing her panties down
23
her throat.” Justice Scalia was referencing McCollum v. North
Carolina, a case co-pending on the Court’s certiorari docket,
and he used McCollum to argue that capital punishment
schemes are necessary to permit “such brutal deaths to be
24
avenged.”
Kansas v. Marsh occasioned Justice Scalia’s third
25
Tetralogy opinion, which he used to contest the empirical risk
of wrongful executions. He wrote: “[Justices flagging the
possibility of wrongful executions do] not discuss a single

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Id.
510 U.S. 1141, 1145 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1143 (Scalia, J., concurring).
Id.
548 U.S. 163 (2006).
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case—not one—in which it is clear that a person was executed
26
for a crime he did not commit.” He saw exonerations not as
evidence of dysfunction, but as proof that the system was
27
working. He argued that the empirical studies suggesting
elevated rates of wrongful executions were ivory work product
28
of abolitionist academics. He concluded: “One cannot have a
system of criminal punishment without accepting the
possibility that someone will be punished mistakenly. . . . But
with regard to the punishment of death in the current
American system, that possibility has been reduced to an
29
insignificant minimum.”
The proposition that innocence claims lack constitutional
30
provenance surfaced most recently in the Davis case (2009),
the final piece of the Tetralogy. As explained in Section II.C,
Davis had been convicted primarily on the basis of cross-racial
eyewitness identification, and there was substantial post-trial
31
recantation. The Supreme Court ultimately remanded Davis
32
for fact-finding on the actual innocence question. Justice
33
Scalia objected to the remand as a “fool’s errand,”
emphasizing the integrity of the state proceedings and the noncognizability of innocence claims. Davis shows that, between
1993 and 2009, Justice Scalia believed nothing about the actual
innocence calculus had changed.
II. THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF GUILT
The Tetralogy captures the arc of Justice Scalia’s critique,
as he fought ferociously, and at times scornfully, against both
the doctrinal innovation necessary to facilitate innocence
litigation and the empirical premises upon which such
innovation was based. The Supreme Court decided Herrera in
the spring of 1993, a year after Peter Neufeld and Barry Scheck
founded an organization called the “Innocence Project” and
before hundreds of DNA exonerations extinguished the
comfortable fiction that wrongful convictions were rarities in
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
(2011).
32.
33.

Id. at 188.
See id. at 193.
Id. at 198.
Id. at 199.
In re Davis, 557 U.S. 952 (2009).
See Lee Kovarsky, Original Habeas Redux, 97 VA. L. REV. 61, 100
See Davis, 557 U.S. at 952.
Id. at 957 (Scalia, J, dissenting).
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American criminal punishment. Workable criminal justice
administration undeniably entails some wrongful guilt
determinations, but the tolerance for such error should relate
inversely to its frequency.
Justice Scalia’s position was grounded in an epistemology
associated with law professor Paul Bator and philosopher Karl
34
Popper. Stated generally, Justice Scalia believed that humans
(and their institutions) cannot “know” the pure metaphysical
truth of past events. Human institutions, lacking such
epistemological privilege, instead use reliable process to
produce estimates and make decisions. Criminal process
therefore assigns guilt through a series of factual
determinations that merely estimate reality. Justice Scalia
perceived no reason why the truth-approximating process of
state legal institutions would be inferior to that of federal ones,
and so he saw no need for the doctrinal innovation necessary to
facilitate actual innocence litigation.
When Justice Scalia penned his Herrera concurrence, his
epistemological critique combined with contemporaneous
assumptions about the reliability of evidence to produce
profound skepticism about whether courts should entertain
freestanding innocence claims. Prior to DNA testing, almost
nobody asserted actual innocence claims, and relief was non35
existent. When the data behind the assumptions changed,
however, Justice Scalia’s position did not. In later decisions,
Justice Scalia was simply unwilling to go where his preferred
framework took him.
A. THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF TRUTH
When Justice Scalia wrote about actual innocence, he
always put the term in quotation marks. The scare quotes
betray something surprisingly post-modern in his view of
innocence. Specifically, his position reflects epistemological
uncertainty that is largely ignored by the formalism with which
he is frequently (and superficially) associated. Indeed, he
inherits his epistemological premises from Professor Paul
36
Bator, who in turn leans heavily on those of Karl Popper.
34. See Seth F. Kramer and David Rudovsky, Double Helix, Double Bind:
Factual Innocence and Postconviction DNA Testing, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 547,
519 n.217 (2000).
35. See Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 55,
61 (2008).
36. See Kramer and Rudovsky, supra note 34, at 519 n.217.
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Absolute truth in the natural world might exist, the theory
goes, but humans cannot “know” it with metaphysical
certainty. A state criminal conviction is an index of truth that
might reflect subordinate indicia that we call evidence—things
like confessions, eyewitness testimony, and forensic evidence.
That evidence can create inferences about historical fact, and
those inferences range from extremely reliable to pure
guesswork. As Herrera itself explains, a subsequent forum
might be uniquely disadvantaged in drawing reliable inferences
about unknowable facts because “the passage of time only
37
diminishes the reliability of criminal adjudications.”
If one admits to the imperfection of human observation and
assessment, Justice Scalia believed, then there is no compelling
reason to have federal courts review pure questions of guilt.
State and judicial institutions are both made up of imperfect
human actors, and one is not necessarily a better truth
approximator than the other. To the extent that new evidence
permits new inferences about unknowable facts, the
opportunity to draw those inferences trades off with the ability
to reliably draw others. Witnesses may have disappeared,
memories may have faded, and physical evidence from trial
might be degraded or unavailable.
The undeniable appeal of Justice Scalia’s position resides
in its suggestion that to accommodate actual innocence
litigation is to deny the most basic tenets of post-modernism.
Actual innocence theories might appear to embrace a quaint,
pre-postmodern view of some observer-independent truth.
Justice Scalia would have argued that we do not—that we
cannot—determine actual innocence. Instead, we can just have
rules about when institutions treat a sufficient approximation
of guilt as binding.
The problem with the argument is that a universe in which
absolute truth is unknowable can also be one with substantial
variation in the reliability of scientific, social, and institutional
devices that we use to imperfectly assign guilt. Justice Scalia’s
scare-quoting made sense when the most reliable indicia of
metaphysical truth were not uniquely available in a
subsequent forum. Herrera posed certain challenges, but not
others. Although the case certainly stood for a broader
institutional question about the availability of a federal habeas
forum to test new evidence, there was a nagging sense that the
37. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 404 (1993).
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new evidence in the case itself was not particularly reliable.
Affidavits exculpating the condemnee and assigning guilt to a
deceased alternative are common, and there were serious
questions about the incentives of Herrera’s nephew.
If the question is not about whether someone is “actually”
innocent and is instead about when new evidence of innocence
requires a new forum to consider inferences, then there may be
good institutional reasons to refuse such incremental process.
What Justice Scalia ultimately failed to acknowledge, however,
was that such an argument works only when one can make preDNA-era assumptions about the reliability of the inferences
themselves. If, for example, inferences drawn from a DNA
exclusion are many orders of magnitude more powerful than
inferences drawn from a criminal conviction, then Justice
Scalia’s proceduralist framework does not just seem to permit a
new forum for reconsideration—it seems to require it. The
requirement is not because an inmate has “actually” shown
innocence, but because the investment in new inferential
approximation is worth the return.
B. CHANGING ASSUMPTIONS
The problem for Justice Scalia, and for Herrera enthusiasts
generally, was two-fold. First, jury verdicts and guilty pleas are
now known to be less reliable estimates of historical truth than
we previously thought. Second, other types of evidence (DNA)
capable of being introduced in subsequent legal proceedings
have emerged as more reliable ones.
Rejecting the idea that humans and their institutions can
“actually” know (verify) innocence is distinct from the
proposition that they should not entertain what are
euphemistically called actual innocence claims. The latter
proposition ignores a circumstance that is perfectly compatible
with post-modern assumptions about the absence of
epistemological privilege. If advances in scientific knowledge
establish certain evidence as more reliable indicia of objective
historical truth than is a criminal conviction, then the
empirical complement to Justice Scalia’s doctrinal critique
vanishes.
DNA evidence is not available in most cases, and even in
cases where it is available, it may be only one piece of a broader
culpability puzzle. In select cases, however, it is capable of
showing, with extraordinarily high probability, that a convicted
offender could not have committed the crime in question.
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Insofar as DNA evidence flags wrongful convictions, academics
can work backwards to understand what types of evidence
produce them. The major culprits are eyewitness testimony,
shoddy forensic science, and, to a lesser extent, false
38
confessions and informants. In other words, DNA does not
just show likely innocence in specific cases, but it also performs
a broader diagnostic function insofar as it provides clues about
the unreliability of other types of evidence.
Justice Scalia refused to attribute such diagnostic
significance to DNA exonerations. Indeed, perhaps the most
troubling aspect of his actual innocence position was his
insistence that the doctrine was a solution in search of a
problem. When faced with mounting DNA evidence that
wrongful convictions happen frequently, Justice Scalia
attempted to parry the concern by arguing that the wrongfulconviction data showed that the system was working, not
failing. In Marsh—the second to last case in the Tetraology
(2006)—he wrote:
[The dissent] speaks as though exoneration came about through the
operation of some outside force to correct the mistakes of our legal
system, rather than as a consequence of the functioning of our legal
system. Reversal of an erroneous conviction on appeal or on habeas, or
the pardoning of an innocent condemnee through executive clemency,
39
demonstrates not the failure of the system but its success.

Whatever its rhetorical appeal, this argument confuses—
probably intentionally—two different functions that DNA
exonerations perform. Exonerations are obviously instances of
post-conviction “success,” but equally obvious is that they also
indicate substantial “failure” in the vast majority of cases
where DNA evidence is unavailable.
DNA exonerations show what sorts of evidence produce
wrongful convictions, but there is not DNA available in every
case. Confessions, informants, junk science, and faulty
eyewitness testimony do not discriminate—they produce
unreliable estimates of guilt even where DNA evidence cannot
exclude a defendant. In Brandon Garret’s landmark study of
the first 250 DNA exonerations, 89 percent of the exonerees
40
had been convicted of rape. That figure exists not because

38. See Garrett, supra note 35, at 60–61; see generally BRANDON L.
GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT (2011) (providing a book-length
exploration of the causes).
39. Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 193 (Scalia, J., concurring).
40. See GARRETT, supra note 38, at 5.
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rape convictions are disproportionately wrongful relative to
convictions for other types of crimes, but because rape
convictions disproportionately involve biological material
necessary to conduct a DNA test and exclude guilt.
The relative unreliability of prior process, however, is only
half of the actual innocence calculus. The other half is the
reliability of the subsequent proceeding. In this respect, DNA
evidence also altered basic assumptions behind Justice Scalia’s
position. DNA evidence introduced after a trial might not
satisfy demands for pure metaphysical truth, but it can be a far
more reliable approximation than a criminal conviction based
on other types of information. As the gap between the
reliability of inferences in prior and subsequent proceedings
grew, the link between the empirical assumptions and Justice
Scalia’s preferred doctrinal rule deteriorated.
C. THE DAVIS LOSS
The Tetralogy expresses Justice Scalia’s position as a
doctrinal rule against actual innocence litigation, supported by
a set of assumptions about the relationship between evidence
and human knowledge. That doctrinal rule also followed from
the familiar originalist position that there exists no string of
constitutional text in which to localize a freestanding claim.
Justice Scalia could hold out for a Supreme Court majority as
long as empirical assumptions complemented the doctrinal
position.
By 2009, the empirical assumptions had shifted
dramatically and the window for Justice Scalia to forge a
winning coalition on the actual innocence position seemed
41
closed. In Davis —the last opinion in the Tetralogy and in
many ways a denouement for the Scalia position—the Court
cut through all sorts of procedural obstacles to remand the case
for an actual innocence determination. Davis was, in many
ways, a litmus test for how severely wrongful-conviction data
had undermined confidence in the reliability of convictions.
Except for a shell casing connected to a gun that law
enforcement never located, Davis was convicted on the basis of
42
eyewitness testimony—most of it cross-racial. (Cross-racial
43
eyewitness testimony is particularly unreliable. ) Seven of the
41. In re Davis, 557 U.S. 952 (2009).
42. See Kovarsky, supra note 31, at 100.
43. See id.
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nine eyewitnesses had recanted, and one of the non-recanting
44
witnesses was the alternative suspect.
Because Davis involved the circuit court’s denial of
authorization to pursue a successive habeas petition and
45
because there is no certiorari review of such orders, the Court
actually ordered the remand by way of an original habeas
46
power that had been dormant for decades. Given the unusual
procedural posture, the remand actually required five votes,
including at least two (and perhaps all) of Justices Roberts,
Kennedy, and Alito. The unsigned per curiam order prompted a
dissent from Justice Scalia—joined only by Justice Thomas—
underscoring the uncertain status of actual innocence claims.
The per curiam order signaled that the majority was more
interested in the bottom line than in the doctrinal details; it
instructed the district court to “receive testimony and make
findings of fact as to whether evidence that could not have been
obtained at the time of trial clearly establishes petitioner’s
47
innocence.” In light of the Justices whose support was
necessarily for such an order, Davis represented a death knell
for the position that Justice Scalia had cultivated so
assiduously since Herrera.
CONCLUSION
Davis and its rejection of Justice Scalia’s position is the
clearest signal of the Supreme Court’s increasing receptivity to
actual innocence litigation. In Herrera, when Justice Scalia
began to use actual innocence cases to explain that the
Constitution permitted systematic criminal punishment in the
face of some imperfection, many fairly viewed him as a candid
realist. As wrongful-conviction data mounted, however, he
clung to the notion that the inevitability of imperfection
released courts from any obligation to renew scrutiny of
convictions.
Recall Justice Scalia’s rejoinder to Justice Blackmun in
Callins—chastising Justice Blackmun for announcing his
refusal to “tinker with the machinery of death” in “one of the

44. See id.
45. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(E) (1996).
46. See generally Kovarsky, supra note 31 (discussing development and
obsolescence of original habeas jurisdiction).
47. Davis, 557 U.S. at 952.
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less brutal of the murders that come before us . . . .” Justice
Scalia mocked Justice Blackmun’s moral equivocation by
describing a gruesome murder for which Henry Lee McCollum
49
had been convicted in a co-pending case. Just before Justice
Scalia passed away, North Carolina freed Mr. McCollum after a
DNA test showed that he had spent 30 years on death row for a
50
crime he did not commit.

48. See Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1143 (Scalia, J., concurring).
49. See id. at 1145 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); id. at 1143 (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
50. See Dahlia Lithwick, A Horrifying Miscarriage of Justice in North
Carolina, SLATE (Sept. 3, 2014), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_
politics/jurisprudence/2014/09/henry_lee_mccollum_cleared_by_dna_evidence_
in_north_carolina_after_spending.html.

